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Abstract
Analyzing the eﬀect of Direct Project Funding (DPF) on innovative performance
of economic agents is a major challenge for innovation economists and policy makers
who must give valid policy recommendations and decide on the allocation of ﬁnancial
resources. An approach that becomes more and more important is the use of agent-based
modeling in analyzing innovative performance of market players. In this paper, an agent-
based percolation model is used to investigate the eﬀects of project funding on innovative
performance in terms of the maximum technological frontier that can be reached as well
as in terms of the number of innovations generated by ﬁrms. The model results show that
ﬁrms which participate in subsidized projects outperform ﬁrms that do not participate
in subsidized projects, especially in increasingly complex technological ﬁelds. However,
the worse performance of ﬁrms that do not participate in subsidized projects can be
oﬀset by an increase in the ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial resources. Hence, the model indicates, the
eﬀect of project funding is a purely ﬁnancial one and might even have negative eﬀects
on innovative performance. This is the case if, for instance, a high number of funded
research projects disturbs ﬁrms’ paths through the technology space. Following the
results of the model, project funding is most eﬀective and important in increasingly
complex technology spaces and less eﬀective and important in less complex technology
spaces. Moreover, the model results show, other ﬁnancial resources as venture capital
can substitute for direct project funding
Key words: project funding, innovation, technology space, agent-based simulation
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1 Introduction
Growing international competition, emerging global challenges as sustainable urban devel-
opment and increasing complexity of products and services force today’s economies to be
as innovative as possible to stay competitive. As a result, to permanently increase ﬁrms’
innovative performance is a major challenge for ﬁrms and policy makers in Germany. To
foster this innovative performance, the German Federal Government supports German com-
panies, research institutions and universities by spending more than 80 billion Euro (3% of
its GDP) on research and development [BMBF, 2014e, p. 18]. One instrument used by the
government to keep Germany’s leading position is the promotion of joint research eﬀorts of
ﬁrms, universities and research institutions by direct project funding (DPF). The overall goal
of direct project funding is to improve ﬁrms’ innovative performance to guarantee long-term
growth [BMBF, 2014f, prologue]. However, it is not a priori clear that project funding is
the right instrument to achieve this ambitious goal. Studies show that the eﬀects of DPF
on innovative performance are not only positive, but can also be negative [Aschhoﬀ/ Sofka,
2009; Czarnitzki et al., 2007; Czarnitzki/ Hussinger, 2004; Fornahl et al., 2011; Hsua/ Hsueh,
2009]. On the one hand, project funding is an additional ﬁnancial resource that does not
only prevent the underinvestment in complex technological ﬁelds, but can also help to ’guide’
ﬁrms through the technology space and foster research in predeﬁned ’socially desirable’ ﬁelds.
On the other hand, project funding costs billions of Euro and might even negatively inﬂu-
ence ﬁrms’ natural trajectories as well as it might prevent market players from other useful
investments by changing their behavior. In addition, government should intervene in the
market only where it is absolutely indispensable [Gabler, 2014]. Therefore, to evaluate policy
intervention in terms of direct project funding is of utmost importance. This evaluation is
necessary to show whether the positive eﬀects of project funding can outweigh its negative
eﬀects as well as to make project funding eﬀective and eﬃcient. Only by doing so, researchers
can legitimize public actions and help politicians to take decisions that foster future develop-
ment. As policy evaluation is such an important topic, this paper uses an agent-based model
for answering the following question: ’What are the eﬀects of ’direct project funding’ (DPR)
on ﬁrms’ innovative performance?’. The agent-based percolation model used in this paper
extends the percolation model of Silverberg/ Verspagen [2007] by incorporating subsidized
R&D projects that inﬂuence the paths ﬁrms choose through the technology space.
The paper is structured as follows: The second chapter provides the reader an overview of
how and why the German Federal Government uses project funding as an instrument of mar-
ket intervention, why the particularities of innovation processes cause problems in innovation
research and how the method of agent-based modelling can help to solve these problems. In
the third chapter, the agent-based percolation model built to answer the research question
named above is presented and the simulation is explained in detail. The fourth chapter
presents the simulation results and compares the results of the basic model to the results of
the model with subsidized R&D projects. In the last, the ﬁfth chapter, the model results of
this paper are summarized and a conclusion as well as an outlook is given.
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2 Theoretical Background
The way in which innovation processes and the search for new knowledge take place has
changed. Today’s economies and sectors become more and more connected and interlinked.
Collaborations across institutional forms and organizational boundaries are common practice
[Powell/ Grodal, 2005, p. 57]. "[C]omplex networks of ﬁrms, universities, and government
labs are critical features for many industries" [Powell/ Grodal, 2005, p. 58]. This leads
to a situation in which "innovation is shifting away from individual ﬁrms towards terri-
torial economies and the distributed networks by which they are linked" [Herstad et al.,
2013, p. 495]. Hence, joint research eﬀorts and interorganizational knowledge exchange are
of growing importance for the competitiveness of ﬁrms and sectors [Herstad et al., 2013,
p. 495]. Therefore, Germany as a knowledge-intensive economy tries to foster both national
and international interdisciplinary joint research eﬀorts between diﬀerent actors in the econ-
omy [BMBF, 2014e, p. 30]. How important such research eﬀorts actually are to the German
government can be seen by the mere fact that the German Federal Government aims at
spending more than 80 billion Euro (3% of its GDP) on research and development [BMBF,
2014e, p. 18]. In fact, thirty percent of all spending on R&D in Germany is provided by
the public sector [BMBF, 2014d]. This public research funding essentially consists of "in-
stitutional funding, goal-oriented project funding and the funding of departmental research"
[BMBF, 2014d]. The goal-oriented project funding or the so-called direct R&D project fund-
ing provides ﬁrms, universities and research institutions the opportunity to participate in
(joint) research projects that are subsidized by the German Federal Government.
As institutional or departmental research funding, the overall objective of project funding
is "to maintain and build on the competitive advantage and excellent reputation of German
research" [BMBF, 2014f, prologue]. However, the main advantage of direct project funding
in comparison to departmental or institutional funding is that project funding can motivate
ﬁrms, universities and research institutions to focus on relevant technological problems and
to prioritize economically and socially desirable research ﬁelds [Spectrum, 1999]. Therefore,
subsidized projects are located at concrete research areas and are implemented within a
framework of diﬀerent research programs [BMBF, 2014d], to support the development of
key technologies in pre-selected key application areas [Aschhoﬀ, 2009, p. 1]. The funding of
key application areas, for instance, aims at solving global challenges, especially in the ﬁelds
of climate and energy, health and nutrition, mobility, security and communication [BMBF,
2014a]. The funding of key technologies, for instance, in automotive, medical technology,
engineering and logistics, complements this funding eﬀort [BMBF, 2014a,b].
According to economic theory, government has to intervene in the market as the public
good features of knowledge lead to market failure. Following this argument, project funding
has to subsidize projects in ﬁelds in which ﬁrms would not invest without additional ﬁnancial
resources. These are, for instance, ﬁelds that are highly complex and therefore too expensive
to explore if the external eﬀects are not internalized [Aschhoﬀ, 2009, p. 1]. Even though the
theoretical argument why project funding is an important instrument is convincing, it still has
to be questioned whether such policy intervention actually can achieve its ambitious goals.
"In the face of shrinking government budgets and intensiﬁed international competition in the
ﬁeld of technology, knowing and increasing the eﬃciency of innovation policies has become
crucial" [Aschhoﬀ, 2008, p. i]. Therefore, it has to be asked whether the instrument of project
funding promotes ’additionality’, i.e. to what extend this instruments promotes additional
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R&D activities and to what extend it simply subsidizes activities that already take place
(windfall-proﬁts).
As project funding aﬀects diﬀerent micro-, meso- and macroeconomic aspects which are in
an interdependent relationship, the eﬀects of project funding on ﬁrms’ innovative performance
can be both positive and negative. Because of these diverse eﬀects, recent literature has
evaluated the eﬀect of direct R&D project funding on, among others, innovative performance
[Czarnitzki et al., 2007; Czarnitzki/ Hussinger, 2004; Fornahl et al., 2011; Hsua/ Hsueh,
2009], private R&D spending [Almus/ Czarnitzki, 2003; Aschhoﬀ, 2009; Czarnitzki/ Fier,
2001; Czarnitzki/ Hussinger, 2004], ﬁrms’ productivity [Colombo et al., 2011] as well as
labor demand and employment [Ali-Yrkkö, 2005; Ebersberger, 2004]. While many studies
investigate a potential crowding-out eﬀect of public R&D subsidies, little has been written
about the eﬀect of publicly subsidized R&D projects on innovative performance of ﬁrms,
universities and research institutions. If investigated, studies mainly measure the eﬀect of
project funding on innovative performance in terms of patent applications [Czarnitzki et al.,
2007; Czarnitzki/ Hussinger, 2004; Fornahl et al., 2011]. As expected, the studies show that
the eﬀect of subsidized research projects on innovative performance is ambiguous and can
be dependent on diﬀerent aspects as ﬁrms’ size, industry, technology novelty and ratio of
public subsidy to ﬁrms’ own R&D budget [Hsua/ Hsueh, 2009]. Czarnitzki/ Hussinger [2004]
show, that publicly sponsored research projects indeed stimulate ﬁrms’ patenting activities.
Czarnitzki et al. [2007] highlight that project funding has a positive eﬀect on ﬁrms’ patenting
activities, but only in Finland and not in Germany. Fornahl et al. [2011] found out that
project funding can increase ﬁrms’ patent applications, but only if government subsidizes
joint research projects. Aschhoﬀ/ Sofka [2009] found out that public funding for innovation
projects does not have any signiﬁcant eﬀect on innovative performance in terms of market
success. Hsua/ Hsueh [2009] show, that public R&D projects have a positive eﬀect on the
technical eﬃciency of such projects, but the eﬀect is dependent on diﬀerent aspects, e.g.
the eﬀect is bigger for small ﬁrms. None of these studies, however, investigates the eﬀect
of research funding on the innovative performance of a research network consisting of ﬁrms,
universities and research institutions. Summing up, it has to be guaranteed that project
funding does not waste resources, but leads to a situation that is socially and economically
preferable. Therefore, the quantitative and qualitative evaluation of subsidized research
projects is important for both policy makers and researchers as well as for the society as a
whole.
However, the main problem with the evaluation of policy intervention in innovation pro-
cesses are the particularities of innovation processes as true uncertainty, bounded rationality,
imperfect information, heterogeneity, non-linear relationships, punctuated equilibria, as well
as both quantitative and qualitative change [Dawid, 2006; Pyka/ Fagiolo, 2005; Silverberg/
Verspagen, 2007]. These particularities, however, are at odds with neoclassical assumptions
of representative, homogeneous, perfectly rational and informed agents. Hence, the tradi-
tional toolkit of economics is inadequate to analyze innovation processes [Dawid, 2006; Pyka/
Fagiolo, 2005; Silverberg/ Verspagen, 2007]. Besides the fact that classical models often hinge
on these over-simplifying, ad-hoc assumptions that are at odds with reality [Pyka/ Fagiolo,
2005, p. 6], these models are also inadequate to analyze innovation processes as they "show
a limited attention to empirical validation and joint reproduction of stylized facts" [Pyka/
Fagiolo, 2005, p. 7]. However, even though traditional models are insuﬃcient for analyzing
innovation processes, this does not mean that such processes cannot be analyzed in general.
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As innovations are not completely random and unrelated, but as there are empirical facts
and patterns that can be observed [Dawid, 2006; Silverberg/ Verspagen, 2005], there exist
possible methods and tools to investigate innovations. One method that is relatively new in
the ﬁeld of innovation policy evaluation, but does not hinge on neoclassical assumptions and
is able to incorporate empirical facts and patterns of innovations processes, is the method of
agent-based modeling in general and agent-based percolation models in particular.
Agent-based modeling becomes more and more important in innovation economics as it
allows to model and analyse complex systems with autonomous, decision-making agents that
interact with each other and with their environment [Garcia, 2005; Macal/ North, 2007]. In
contrast to homogeneous, representative agents with perfect knowledge, agents in an agent-
based simulation act autonomous and independently in their environment. They are equipped
with a kind of social ability that allows them to communicate with other agents, they act
goal-directed to achieve a certain goal and they are ﬂexible and can adapt their behavior to
other agents’ behavior and their environment [Macal/ North, 2007, p. 96]. ABM can help
to not only understand agents’ or individual’s behavior, but also to understand aggregate
behavior and how the behavior and interaction of many individual agents leads to large-scale
outcomes [Axelrod, 1997, p. 4]. The behavior that is modeled in this paper follows the basic
idea of percolation theory.
"Percolation theory is the study of an idealized random medium in two or more di-
mensions. Percolation models describe and investigate the percolation of a medium as, for
instance, liquid or gas through a porous surface [Shante/ Kirkpatrick, 1971, p. 326]. In a
percolation model, the ﬂuid ﬂows along oriented or unoriented paths where some bonds are
accessible and some bonds are blocked and therefore inaccessible [Shante/ Kirkpatrick, 1971,
p. 328]. The percolation probability in a model with bond percolation describes the proba-
bility that an edge between two cells is ’open’ such that a medium, as, for instance, water,
can pass from one lattice cell to another [Grimmett, 1997, p. 147]. Using these models and
the percolation probability one can investigate if and how ’easy’ a medium can pass through
a certain surface, dependent on the kind of surface1.
Already in 1991, Mort [1991] investigated the applicability of percolation theory to in-
novation processes. He found out that "the spread of innovations may be proﬁtably consid-
ered as one manifestation of percolation phenomenon" [Mort, 1991, p. 37/ 38]. Nowadays,
economists, as for instance Silverberg/ Verspagen and Goldschlag, make use of this theory to
investigate how (the medium) ﬁrm moves through the (surface) technology space, dependent
on certain characteristics of the surface, e.g. dependent on the complexity of the technol-
ogy space. Questions that such models can possibly answer are: "How easy can ﬁrms move
through the technology space, if the technology space becomes increasingly complex?" or
"What model parameters can help ﬁrms to percolate goal-directed through the technology
space, if this space is very complex?". By using such an agent-based percolation model of
innovation processes, Silverberg/ Verspagen [2005] were able to endogenize the creation of
technological trajectories, to replicate empirical facts of innovation processes and to investi-
1For a deeper insight in Percolation Theory in Physics and Mathematics see: Shante, V. K. S./ Kirkpatrick,
S. (1971), An introduction to percolation theory, Advances in Physics, p. 325 - 357, 1971, Grimmett, G.
(1997), Percolation and Disordered Systems, Originally published in: Ecole d’Eté de Probabilités de Saint-
Flour XXVI, 1996, 141 Lecture Notes in Mathematics, Vol. 1665, p. 153 - 300, Springer-Verlag Berlin
Heidelberg, 1997 and Grimmett, G. R. (1999), Percolation, Grundlehren der mathematischen Wissenschaften,
Volume 321, 1999.
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gate how the eﬃciency of diﬀerent search strategies varies with technological opportunities.
In addition, in their paper in 2007, Silverberg/ Verspagen [2007] incorporated economically
motivated endogenous search eﬀort and found out that this self-organized search eﬀort might
even have negative eﬀects on innovative performance, if ﬁrms focus solely on "hot ’lodes’
of technological richness" [Silverberg/ Verspagen, 2007, p. 227]. Goldschlag [2013] used an
agent-based percolation model to investigate the eﬀect of patents (that block certain cells, i.e.
make them inaccessible for the medium ﬁrm) on ﬁrm’s innovative performance, dependent
on the complexity of the surface technology space. His results showed that monopoly power
of ﬁrms can substitute for patent protection and that patents mainly improve innovative
performance in situations with little monopoly power and a suﬃciently diﬃcult technology
space. Besides these percolation models, there is a broad range of further issues in inno-
vation economics that is addressed with (agent-based) percolation models, as for instance
eco-innovation diﬀusion [Cantono/ Silverberg, 2009], the diﬀusion of innovation in diﬀerent
networks [Zeppini/ Frenken, 2013] or the ﬂow of knowledge and its relationship to innovation
[Popescul, 2012].
3 The Model
The model of innovation presented in this paper2 is based on the work of Silverberg/ Verspa-
gen [2007] as well as on the work of Goldschlag [2013]. The model uses the idea of economically
motivated endogenous search eﬀort of Silverberg/ Verspagen [2007] and extends their model
by incorporating subsidized R&D projects that inﬂuence the diﬀerent paths agents choose
through the technology space, which is inspired by the work of Goldschlag [2013].
The underlying idea of this model is that agents ’percolate’ through the technology space
to choose technological regions where to perform R&D and to generate innovations. Research
and development is costly, but agents are rewarded for successful innovations and agents can
use paths of other agents and beneﬁt from knowledge-spillovers. In the model, the ways or
paths agents choose through the technology space are dependent on the technology space
itself and on the motivation agents have to move through the technology space. In the
following section, the technology space is explained in more detail, which is followed by an
explanation of how and why agents percolate through the space and perform R&D in a basic
model and in a model with project funding.
3.1 Technology Space
In the model we assume a two-dimensional technology space. The horizontal dimension rep-
resents diﬀerent ﬁelds of technology or the "universe of technological niches" [Silverberg/
Verspagen, 2005, p. 214] with neighbouring columns being technologically more closely re-
lated. As in the model of Silverberg/ Verspagen [2007], the technology space wraps hori-
zontally and thus is like a vertical cylinder which makes the left and the right edges column
neighbours. The vertical dimension of the space represents the ﬁtness of a given technology,
such that higher cells in one technological niche represent a technology that is ﬁtter. Hence,
2The model presented in this paper was built with the free-of-charge software NetLogo that can be
downloaded here: https://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/. For the model code, please contact the author.
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each lattice cell aij represents the ﬁtness (j) of a technology of a certain technological niche
(i). Lattice cells are characterized by their state sij and by their resistance value ρij ≥ 0.
A lattice cell can be in one of three diﬀerent states; state 0, state 1 and state 2. A
lattice cell in state 0 is undiscovered, i.e. the technology is unknown or not yet discovered.
A lattice cell in state 1 is discovered, i.e. the technology is known by some agents, but
these agents do not connect this technology to their technology stock and do not use the
technology to generate innovations. Lattice cells in state 2 are both discovered and viable,
i.e. the technology is known and used by the agents to generate innovations.
Each cell has a resistance value ρij for row i and column j (drawn from a lognormal
distribution with mean μρ and standard deviation σρ). The resistance value ρij captures
the amount of eﬀort that is necessary to discover cell (i,j), i.e. it reﬂects the diﬃculty of
acquiring and using the technology. In the model, agents move through the technology space
by selecting cells, performing R&D on that cells, connecting these cells to their baseline and
being rewarded for successful innovations. Agents theoretically have access to all cells with
some of the cells being more diﬃcult to access than others. How ’easy’ agents can move
through the technology space is dependent on the complexity of the technology space, i.e.
on the cells’ resistance values ρij. The higher the resistance values, the more diﬃcult and
expensive it is for the agents to perform R&D. The technology in cell (i,j) switches from state
0 (unknown) to state 1 (known but unused) once a the agent decreases the cell’s resistance
value to 0. The technology in cell (i,j) switches from state 1 to state 2 (known and used)
if an agent connects the technology to its baseline by an unbroken chain of discovered and
viable cells. A lattice cell’s resistance value can be reduced by agent’s R&D investment.
One concept of the model that is very important is the so-called ’best practice frontier’
(BPF). The concept of a BPF is used by Silverberg/ Verspagen [2005, 2007] and Goldschlag
[2013] to describe the highest possible cell in a row that is known and used, i.e. that is in
state 2. The best practice frontier is the technological frontier of all technological niches, i.e.
the BPF represents the ﬁttest technology in every niche that is known and used. So, the
BPF at time t with Nc is deﬁned as:
BPF (t) = {(i, j(i)), i = 1, ..., N c} with j(i) = (max j | sij = 2), (3.1.1)
where sij reﬂects the state of the cell, i.e. sij = 2 indicates that the technology in the cell is
known and used.
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Figure 1: The best practice frontier (BPF) in the basic percolation model. Grey cells are
undiscovered (state 0), blue cells are discovered, but not yet used (state 1) and green cells
are discovered and viable (state 2). The line of red cells represents the BPF, i.e. red cells
are the highest cells in one column that are discovered and viable. Own ﬁgure.
As already explained earlier in that paper, to adequately model innovation processes one
has to refrain from using neoclassical over-simplifying assumptions, but to build on patterns
and stylized facts of the innovation process. The model presented in this paper uses four
stylized facts of innovation processes as assumptions/ input factors. First, innovations and
technical change are cumulative [Silverberg/ Verspagen, 2005, p. 227], i.e. new knowledge
and new technologies always build on previous search activities and discoveries, not only in
the same, but also in seemingly unrelated ﬁelds. Therefore, in the model an innovation is
only generated if an agent connects new knowledge and new technology to its baseline by
an unbroken chain of discovered and viable technologies. This means that new technologies
in isolation are not innovations, but inventions. Only if agents connect their inventions to
previous innovations, they can make economic use of the new technology. Second, innova-
tion processes are uncertain, the arrival of innovations appears to be a stochastic process
[Silverberg/ Verspagen, 2005, 2007], i.e. we can’t predict innovations in advance, but have
to deal not only with risk, but with true uncertainty. Therefore, agents’ investment in R&D
in the model is related to a random variable β ∈ [0, 1) that is diﬀerent for every agent in
each period, which reﬂects the stochastic nature of innovation processes. So, in some cases
it can be that agents invest in R&D and do not generate inventions or innovations at all.
Third, search for new knowledge and new technologies is local [Silverberg/ Verspagen, 2005,
p. 227], i.e. agents tend to perform R&D close to technological regions they already know.
This is incorporated into the model by a search radius rs3 in which the agent searches for
new knowledge and performs R&D. Even though it would be possible for the agent to per-
form R&D in a completely unrelated ﬁeld outside the agents’ search radius, the agent will
never do so. Fourth, technical change takes place in relatively ordered pathways [Silverberg/
3The search radius rs used in this model is a Von Neumann or a diamond shaped radius. The radius
might have an inﬂuence on the way in which agents move through the technology space, such that the paths
agents choose with a diamond shaped radius is slightly diﬀerent from the paths agents would have chosen
with a Moore or square shaped radius. Whether this makes relevant diﬀerence in the outcome of the model
is subject to further research. The radius used in the model can be transformed easily into a square shaped
radius.
8
Verspagen, 2005, p. 227], i.e. "from all the possible directions technological development
may take, only a small portion are realized" [Silverberg/ Verspagen, 2005, p. 227]. This is
incorporated into to model by agents that can and will use other agents’ paths, which leads
to technological regions that stay completely undiscovered. By building on these stylized
facts, the model is able to replicate empirical facts as the highly skewed size distribution of
innovations [Silverberg/ Verspagen, 2005, p. 228], the path-dependency of technical change
and innovations [Goldschlag, 2013, p. 2/ 3] and the fact that the arrival rate of innovations
tends to cluster in time
3.2 The Firm-Based R&D-Process
Agents in the model actually represent diﬀerent ﬁrms. As the model build in this paper
is a simple basic model, it does not incorporate diﬀerent actors as ﬁrms, universities or
research organizations, which, however, would be possible. Therefore, when analyzing the
results of the model it has to be kept in mind that this version of the model only investigates
the behavior of a set of ﬁrms. These ﬁrms follow simple behavioral rules to move through
the technology space and to perform R&D. Before the ﬁrst model run, ﬁrms are randomly
distributed on the baseline of the technology space. Each period in time t, ﬁrms undergo the
following three-step-procedure:
1. Firms scan the best practice frontier BPF, face the highest cell within their search
radius rs that is discovered and viable and move stepwise to that cell.
2. Starting from the BPF, ﬁrms randomly choose an undiscovered cell within their search
radius rs and perform R&D on that cell.
3. After the ﬁrms have performed R&D, they are rewarded by a certain amount dependent
on the size of the innovation they generated.
The ﬁrst step, the movement to the BPF prior to choosing a cell on which to perform
R&D, implies that there are "inter-ﬁrm externalities or spillovers, where an active ﬁrm can
take advantage of innovations made by other ﬁrms" [Goldschlag, 2013, p. 5]. So, as another
ﬁrm already explored the technology, ﬁrms do not have to invest in that technology, but
can simply add this technology to their technology stock. To which cell in the BPF a ﬁrm
moves is dependent on the search radius rs and on coincidence. The higher the search radius,
the higher the amount of possible cells on the BPF a ﬁrm can move to. A higher search
radius enables ﬁrms to move to technological niches that are far away from their original
technological niche. From the set of all BPF cells in the ﬁrm’s search radius, the ﬁrm
randomly chooses the/ one of the highest BPF cells within its search radius. Firms do not
simply ’jump’ to the BPF, but it is assumed that even though ﬁrms can use paths of other
ﬁrms, moving to the BPF takes time. So ﬁrms face the BPF and move to the highest BPF
cell, one step each period. This leads to a situation in which ﬁrms can use the technology
and the technological paths of other ﬁrms, however ’learning’ and integrating this knowledge
takes time and there will be technological leaders and technological followers. This has an
inﬂuence on the reward ﬁrms get for successful innovations, which is explained later.
In the second step, after the ﬁrm has moved to the BPF, it locally searches for a cell on
which to perform R&D. To do so, the ﬁrm randomly selects a cell within its search radius
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and performs R&D on that cell (reduces the cells resistance value). The fact that ﬁrms do
not explicitly choose a certain cell, but randomly choose a cell on which to perform R&D,
incorporates that research is uncertain and that ﬁrms never know in advance in which niche
their research is located. The objective of the ﬁrm is to reduce the cells resistance value in
period t until it becomes zero and the cell switches from undiscovered (0) to discovered but
unused (1) or even to discovered and used (2). The cells resistance value ρij is reduced by
ﬁrms’ R&D eﬀort according to the following rule:
ρij,t+1 = ρij,t − btβ with β ∈ [0, 1), (3.2.1)
where bt is the part of the ﬁrm’s R&D budget that the ﬁrm invested in period t to acquire
the technology in the cell and β reﬂects a random variable drawn from a uniform distribution
β ∈ [0, 1) to reﬂect the stochastic nature of the R&D process4. Dependent on the actual value
of β, the ’eﬀective’ investment of the ﬁrm can be lower than the amount actually invested
and therefore can be lower than the resistance value. This can lead to a situation in which
the ﬁrm invests its whole budget, but does not manage to reduce the cells resistance value at
all. However, as all ﬁrms follow the same behavioral rules, it is likely that there is more than
one ﬁrm performing R&D on the same cell. As these ﬁrms do not ’cooperate’ in the narrow
sense of the word, all ﬁrms independently invest in the reduction of the resistance value until
one ﬁrm ﬁnally reduces the resistance value to 0. However, as soon as the cell switches to
state 1, all ﬁrms can use the knowledge without additional eﬀort.
In the third step, the ﬁrm is rewarded for the innovation it possibly created and the ﬁrm’s
R&D budget for next period’s investment changes. In the model we have both inventions
and innovations. An invention happens when a certain cell is set from state 0 to state 1,
i.e. a certain technology is discovered due to R&D activities. An innovation happens when
the BPF jumps upwards, i.e. when the ﬁttest technologies that are viable and used become
even ﬁtter [Silverberg/ Verspagen, 2007, p. 215]. The size of the innovation si captures the
number of rows the BPF has jumped upwards in a certain column in one period [Silverberg/
Verspagen, 2007, p. 215/ 216]5. Firms in the model are not only rewarded for successful R&D
activities, but at the same time they have to bear the costs of their R&D activities. So, the
ﬁrm’s R&D budget in period t consists of an exogenous part, of the budget that is left over
from the last period, of the potential reward for successful innovations minus the costs of last
period’s investment:
Bt = πt +Bt-1 + si, t-1π − bt-1 with B0 = πstart + π0. (3.2.2)
πt represents an exogenous part of the ﬁrm’s budget that every ﬁrm gets in each period,
which can be seen as a kind of venture capital. πstart represents a starting budget that every
ﬁrm gets in period 0. Bt-1+si, t-1π represents the endogenous part of the ﬁrm’s budget, which
consists of the budget that is left over from last period Bt-1 ∈ [0,∞), if any, and the reward
for a successful innovation generated in column (i) si, t-1π, if any. The budget that is left over
from last period Bt-1 can’t become negative, i.e. a ﬁrm can never spend more than it actually
4β varies for every ﬁrm in each period of the search process to capture the uncertain nature of innovative
search.
5In this model, it is assumed that these kinds of innovations reﬂect incremental innovations as jumps in
the BPF show that technologies incrementally become ﬁtter. Whether and how to incorporate diﬀerent kinds
of innovations into the model is open to further research.
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has. The reward for an innovation consists of the innovation size si, t-1 times the payoﬀ per
’unit’ of innovation π. The innovation size si, t-1 captures the number of rows the BPF has
jumped upwards in the column the ﬁrm had last performed R&D on, no matter if this ﬁrm
actually ’produced’ this innovation. The innovation can also be a product of free-riding from
other ﬁrms’ activities. bt-1 reﬂects the investment the ﬁrm had to make in the last period
to perform R&D, i.e. the ’costs’ of performing R&D on a cell. The venture capital of each
period, the starting budget and the payoﬀ ’per unit’ of innovation are assumed to be equal
for every ﬁrm in each period as uncertainty is already captured by the stochastic parameter.
However, to make the model more and more realistic in future research, these parameters
can be modiﬁed easily to vary for every ﬁrm in each period.
In the model, as in the real world, R&D is costly. To reduce a cell’s resistance value to
0, a ﬁrm has to ’eﬀectively’ invest at least ρij, i.e. Bt
!
> ρij,t ∧ btβ
!≥ ρij,t. As the ﬁrm does
not know the value of the stochastic parameter, it plans to invest its whole budget and only
stops investing if the resistance value is reduced to 0 or if the budget is fully consumed. If the
ﬁrm’s budget (and its ’eﬀective’ investment) is suﬃcient to reduce the resistance value to 0,
the cell switches from state 0 to state 1 and it might even be that the ﬁrm has some budget
left over (if btβ ≥ ρij,t → ρij,t+1 = 0 and Bt+1 ≥ 0). If the ﬁrm’s budget is not suﬃcient to
reduce the resistance value to 0, the ﬁrm invests its whole budget even though this does not
switch the cell from state 0 to state 1 (if btβ < ρij,t → ρij,t+1 > 0 and Bt+1 = 0). As the
ﬁrm randomly selects a cell on which to perform R&D, it is assumed that the ﬁrm will not
automatically stay on the cell it previously performed R&D on. If the ﬁrm does not manage
to successfully perform R&D on a cell in one period, it randomly selects this or another cell
in the next period. In the model, this behavior is assumed as ﬁrms often perform R&D by
trial and error and do never know the exact technological niche they are performing R&D in.
3.3 The Firm-Based R&D-Process in a World with Project Funding
The basic model is extended by subsidized research projects in which ﬁrms can participate.
Project funding can be turned on and oﬀ in the model. The government subsidizes research
projects to intervene in market failure. Market failure exists, as ﬁrms do not invest the
’socially optimal’ amount of money in certain technological ﬁelds that are too diﬃcult or too
expensive (high resistance value). In these cases, ﬁrms tend to work around such technological
ﬁelds, which is - according to economic theory - a socially undesirable behavior. In a world
with project funding, ﬁrms are rewarded by a research grant, each period they participate
in such a subsidized project. In the model, it is assumed that the ﬁrms’ search radius for a
research project rs projects is at least the size of the search radius rs to perform R&D. This is
assumed, as the research grant is an extra incentive for the ﬁrms to perform R&D in regions
they might not have performed without additional ﬁnancial incentives.
Following the argument of project funding as a policy intervention to correct for market
failure, the goal is to subsidize projects in ﬁelds in which ﬁrms would not invest without
additional ﬁnancial resources. Therefore, in the model the government subsidizes technolog-
ical ﬁelds that are highly complex and therefore too expensive to explore. This means that
subsidized research projects are placed on those technological ﬁelds that have the highest
resistance values. As ﬁrms in the model perform R&D according to trial and error and stop
to invest in ﬁelds in which R&D is not successful, ﬁrms are much more likely to choose an
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easier and less expensive way through the technology space than a way with cells that are
highly complex. In the model, there are no certain conditions or restrictions to participate in
subsidized projects. All ﬁrms with subsidized projects in their radius have the possibility to
participate in those projects, no matter how many ﬁrms already participate in one project.
Firms can participate in a research project until the resistance value of the cell the project
is placed on, reaches 0. When the cell switches from state 0 to state 1, project funding is
not necessary any more and project funding stops on this cell. This is done to reﬂect govern-
ment’s behavior just in the moment one project is successfully completed. When one project
is successfully completed, another project is placed on the cell in the technology space with
the highest resistance value that is not subsidized, yet.
In a world that oﬀers the opportunity to participate in subsidized research projects, the
simple behavioral rules of ﬁrms are slightly diﬀerent from those in the basic model. Each
period in time t, ﬁrms undergo the following three-step-procedure:
1. As in the model without projects, ﬁrms scan the best practice frontier BPF, face the
highest cell within their search radius rs that is discovered and viable and move stepwise
to that cell.
2. In contrast to the model without projects, ﬁrms always prefer to perform R&D on a
cell that is subsidized by a project. If there exists a subsidized project in the ﬁrm’s
search radius for a research project rs projects, the ﬁrm will move to that project. If there
is more than one project, the ﬁrm randomly selects one of these projects. If there is no
such project, ﬁrms will randomly choose an undiscovered cell within their search radius
rs (and act as in a world without project funding).
3. After the ﬁrms have performed R&D, they are rewarded. Firms that were unable to
participate in subsidized projects are rewarded as in a world without project funding.
Firms that were able to participate in subsidized projects are also rewarded for innova-
tions they possibly created, but get an additional research grant γt, no matter if they
actually produced an innovation, or not.
The ﬁrst step, the movement to the BPF prior to choosing a cell on which to perform
R&D, is not diﬀerent from the model without projects.
The second step, however, is. In a model with project funding, ﬁrms will always prefer
to participate in projects, i.e. they will always prefer to perform R&D on cells that are
subsidized by research projects even though these cells are more expensive. This preference
changes the ﬁrms’ way through the technology space. Again, as without project funding, it
is likely that more than one ﬁrm participates in a research project. In the case with projects,
it is even more likely, as rs projects ≥ rs and as ﬁrms will always participate in projects if there
are some. In the model it is assumed that all ﬁrms that participate in such a research project
get the same grant of the same size for each period they participate in such a project.
In the third step, the ﬁrm’s budget is also dependent on ﬁrm’s participation in subsidized
projects. If ﬁrms participate in projects, they get a grant in each period t they perform R&D
on a subsidized cell. So, if there is a subsidized project within the search radius for a research
project the ﬁrm’s R&D budget in period t is:
Bt = πt +Bt-1 + si, t-1π − bt-1 + γt with B0 = πstart + π0, (3.3.1)
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where γt represents the research grant the ﬁrm gets each period it participates in a research
project. If there are no subsidized projects within the search for projects radius of the ﬁrm,
the ﬁrm’s R&D budget in period t is again (4.2.2).
The following section shows how the parameterization of the model can lead to diﬀerent
outcomes.
4 Simulation Results
In this paper, the main focus lies on how diﬀerent variables of the model inﬂuence the eﬀect
of project funding on ﬁrms’ innovative performance. Innovative performance in this model
is measured in terms of the maximum height of the best practice frontier (BPF) as well as
in the number of innovations produced in a model run. The mean and maximum height of
the BPF show how ’ﬁt’ the technologies in the model are and how ’far’ the ﬁrms managed to
percolate through the technology space. This shows how far the technologies of this economy
are developed. Hence, it is assumed that a parameterization that helps ﬁrms to reach a higher
maximum BPF is better in terms of innovative performance than another parameterization
that leads to a situation in which ﬁrms can only reach a lower maximum BPF. The same holds
true for the number of innovations. The mean number of innovations counts all innovations,
which are measured as BPF jumps, that resulted from R&D activities in the model. Even
though many economists and politicians yearn for the exact number of innovations generated
in an economy, it has to be kept in mind that the number of innovations presented in this
paper is only quantitative and gives no qualitative information. The model, as it is now, is
not able to diﬀerentiate between incremental and radical innovations, nor is it able to make
statements about the relevance of single innovations and their impact on the economy.
Besides the maximum BPF and the number of innovations, another outcome that is
evaluated is the so-called ’mean trajectory change’ of ﬁrms. The mean trajectory change
measures how often ﬁrms change their technological niche in which they perform R&D. This
gives information about how diversiﬁed research of the ﬁrms in the model is. In addition,
the mean trajectory changes allow to investigate if and how it is possible to motivate ﬁrms
to not only stay in their own technological niche. A high or low number of mean trajectory
changes of ﬁrms can be both positive and negative. On the one hand, ﬁrms that work in
diﬀerent ﬁelds have access to diﬀerent kinds of knowledge and can possibly create diﬀerent,
if not breakthrough innovations. On the other hand, it is conceivable that ﬁrms that change
their technological niche too often do not manage to develop their technologies at all and will
therefore stay behind other ﬁrms that are more ’focused’ (technological leaders). Whether the
mean trajectory changes inﬂuence ﬁrm’s innovative performance in a positive or in a negative
way is open to further research. However, a world that is increasingly interconnected and
complex requires ﬁrms that are able to integrate knowledge from diﬀerent technological ﬁelds.
These ﬁrms have a higher mean trajectory change.
It is often the case that researchers investigate those parameters and parameter changes
that can be manipulated by ﬁrms or policy makers. Even though it is interesting how, e.g.
the payoﬀ per innovation, aﬀects the number of innovations, this is not investigated in the
model. The parameters that actually are investigated in the model, are those parameters
that can be directly aﬀected by ﬁrms or by policy intervention. Therefore, the following
eﬀects are analyzed in this chapter: In the sensitivity analysis (4.2), the eﬀects of diﬀerent
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model parameters on the innovative performance of ﬁrms in terms of the maximum BPF
and on the number of projects are investigated. In the further analysis (4.3), the eﬀects of
diﬀerent model parameters on the mean trajectory changes of ﬁrms are analyzed. Table 1
summarizes the four tests6 that are used to investigate the eﬀects of project funding7.
Test Deﬁnition
Test 1: Eﬀect of technology space complexity on max BPF and number of innovations.
Test 2: Eﬀect of number of projects on max BPF and number of innovations.
Test 3: Eﬀect of technology space complexity on mean trajectory change.
Test 4: Eﬀect of number of projects on mean trajectory change.
Table 1: Diﬀerent tests used to investigate the eﬀect of project funding on innovative perfor-
mance and on mean trajectory changes. Own table.
Before the model results are presented, the next subchapter gives an insight in the pa-
rameterization and in the reasons behind the parameterization of the model.
4.1 Parameterization of the Model
Before the ﬁrst model run, the environment of the model is initialized. Dependent on the
parameters chosen by the researcher, the technology spaces and the model outcomes can
diﬀer remarkably. The parameters chosen in this analysis try to be in line with real-world
parameters to represent reality as good as possible.
In the model it is assumed that we have less ﬁrms than technological niches. Dependent
on the parameterization, the ﬁrms’ search radius rs lies between 2 and 5, with a search radius
for projects rs projects = 5. It is assumed that the search radius for projects is at least of the
same size as the ’standard’ search radius, as ﬁrms are assumed to have a higher willingness
to perform R&D in ﬁelds that are less related to their own technological niche, if they are
rewarded for this behavior. In addition, especially universities and research institutions rely
on publicly funded projects. Therefore, they are assumed to be more ﬂexible and to be
more likely to work in ﬁelds that are less related to their original technological niche. All
ﬁrms in the model are equipped with a starting R&D budget πstart = 30, such that all ﬁrms
have enough money to successfully perform R&D in the ﬁrst period. Each period t, ﬁrms
get venture capital πt between 1 and 25. Venture capital of 1 is about 3% of ﬁrms payoﬀ
per innovations and shall ensure that ﬁrms that are unsuccessful in previous periods do not
have to leave the market. Venture capital of 5 or 10 is about 15 - 30% of ﬁrms payoﬀ
per innovations and venture capital of 25 is more than 70% of ﬁrms payoﬀ per innovation.
Comparing R&D spending as a percentage of revenue in Europe in diﬀerent industries in
2011, we have spending of less than 3% in chemicals and energy, spendings of 15% in the
health sector and spendings of more than 15% in the software or ICT sector [PwC, 2014].
Firms in the model only earn money by creating innovations and spend their whole budget
6The β-coeﬃcients of the tests result from a simple OLS-Regression. The test statistics can be seen in
appendix - D1 - D3.
7For a more detailed table of all tests see appendix - B1 & B2.
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to perform R&D. Therefore, in the model it is assumed that ﬁrms get (what is in the model
called) ’venture capital’ of the same size as the size of typical R&D spending. Firms that
participate in subsidized research projects additionally get research grants γt of 10 to 25.
These parameters are chosen as the German Federal Government covers up to 50 percent
of the project costs of subsidized research projects [Aschhoﬀ, 2009, p. 1]. Research grants
of 25 are chosen to investigate the impact of research grants that are remarkably higher
than those usually paid. Even though, in absolute terms, the number of subsidized research
projects is higher than the number of ﬁrms in the model, the number of subsidized projects
that are accessible in one period is lower. So in the model, there a fewer subsidized research
projects that are accessible in single periods than ﬁrms. After the model is initialized using
the parameterization explained above, the model runs a ﬁxed number of periods such that
diﬀerent outcomes can be analyzed. All model outcomes presented in this paper (except for
the typical model run presented in this section) are resulting from ten model repetitions with
100 periods, each model run.
Before the evaluation of the model outcomes (the sensitivity analysis), the model has
to be veriﬁed and validated. This means that it has to be ensured that the researcher
has built the model right (veriﬁcation) and that the researcher has built the right model
(validation) [Balci, 1997, p. 135]. One possibility to assess the validity of the simulation
model is the so-called empirical validation, to evaluate the "extent to which the model’s
outputs approximate reality, typically described by one or more ’stylized facts’ drawn from
empirical research" [Fagiolo et al., 2007, p. 191]. As the model of Silverberg/ Verspagen
[2005, 2007] and Goldschlag [2013], the model presented in this paper is able to replicate
stylized fact of innovation processes, namely the highly screwed distribution of innovation
sizes and the roughly linear decrease in the frequency of innovation sizes, suggesting a power-
law process. Figure 2 shows the stylized facts resulting from a typical model run8. On the
left-hand side (ﬁgure 2(a)), the histogram demonstrates the highly skewed size distribution
of innovation sizes in the model, with many small innovations and only very few larger
innovations. On the right-hand side (ﬁgure 2(b)), the log-log-plot demonstrates the roughly
linear decrease in innovation size frequency. Simple OLS-regression gives a β-coeﬃcient of
-2,16 (with R = 0, 93, R2 = 0, 92 and p < 0, 01). These results indicate that the model is
able to replicate empirical facts.
8See appendix - A for the parameters of a typical model run.
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(a) Histogram of innovation sizes. (b) Log-log graph of innovation sizes.
Figure 2: Stylized facts in the model. Own ﬁgure.
4.2 Sensitivity Analysis
The sensitivity analysis investigates the eﬀects of changes in model parameters on model
outcomes. The following subchapter presents the model results of parameter changes on
innovative performance. Test 1 investigates how the eﬀect of an increase in technology space
complexity on ﬁrms’ innovative performance is aﬀected by diﬀerent search radii (test 1a), by
diﬀerent ﬁnancial resources (test 1b) and by diﬀerent ﬁnancial resources, but equal research
grants (test 1c). The test compares the results of ﬁrms in a world with project funding to
the results of ﬁrms in a world without project funding. Test 2 analyzes how the eﬀect of an
increase in the number of subsidized projects on ﬁrms’ innovative performance is inﬂuenced
by diﬀerent search radii (test 2a), by diﬀerent ﬁnancial resources (test 2b) and by diﬀerent
ﬁnancial resources, but equal research grants (test 2c). This tests investigates these eﬀects
only in a world with project funding.
Test 1a investigates how the maximum best practice frontier and the number of innova-
tions change with increasing complexity of the technology space and with diﬀerent search
radii. This is done to analyze whether the fact that search is local has an eﬀect on ﬁrms’
innovative performance and whether this eﬀect is diﬀerent in technology spaces that diﬀer in
their complexity. In the model of Silverberg/ Verspagen [2005], an increasing search radius
leads to a situation in which "the mean rate of innovation increases until a plateau is reached"
[Silverberg/ Verspagen, 2005, p. 225]. Figure 3 compares a situation when ﬁrms have a low
search radius (ﬁgure 3(a) and 3(c)) to a situation when ﬁrms have a high search radius (ﬁg-
ure 3(b) and 3(d)). First, it can be seen that the maximum BPF that is reached with and
without project funding decreases the more complex the technology space gets. In addition,
ﬁrms in a world with project funding outperform ﬁrms in a world without project funding,
especially with increasing technology space complexity. In a world with project funding, the
negative relationship between the maximum BPF and the mean resistance value is stronger
with a higher search radius. In a world without project funding, the strong decrease in inno-
vative performance already occurs in simpler technology spaces if ﬁrms have a higher search
radius. Figure 3(c) and 3(d) show that an increase in technology space complexity leads
to a decrease in the number of innovations produced in an economy. The negative eﬀect
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of technology space complexity on innovative performance is six times stronger in a world
without project funding than in a world with project funding. Even though this negative
eﬀect is of almost the same size with high and low search radius, the total number of inno-
vations with high search radius is only of about 70% of the number of innovations with a
lower search radius. Diﬀerent from the maximum BPF, the number of innovations in a world
with project funding is not always higher than the number of innovations in a world without
project funding. With low search radius, the number of innovations in a world with project
funding is only higher than the number of innovations in a world without project funding,
after the technology space reached a certain complexity threshold. With low search radius in
a simpler technology space, the number of innovations without projects is even higher than
the number of innovations with projects. Figure 3 shows that, in contrast to the results of
Silverberg/ Verspagen [2005], the eﬀect of a higher search radius on innovative performance
is negative and that ﬁrms with a lower search radius perform better than ﬁrms with a higher
search radius, even in more complex technology spaces.
(a) The max best practice frontier (BPF) depen-
dent on technology space complexity with low
search radius.
(b) The max best practice frontier (BPF) depen-
dent on technology space complexity with high
search radius.
(c) Number of innovations dependent on technol-
ogy space complexity with low search radius.
(d) Number of innovations dependent on technol-
ogy space complexity with high search radius.
Figure 3: Test 1a: The best practice frontier (BPF) and the number of innovations dependent
on technology space complexity and search radius. Own ﬁgure.
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Test 1b investigates how the maximum best practice frontier and the number of inno-
vations change with increasing complexity of the technology space in a situation with and
without venture capital. This is done to investigate whether ﬁrms that have access to venture
capital perform signiﬁcantly better than ﬁrms that have no access to venture capital and to
investigate which role technology space complexity plays in both situations9. Figure 4 com-
pares a situation in which ﬁrms have no venture capital (ﬁgure 4(a) and 4(c)) to a situation
in which ﬁrms have venture capital (ﬁgure 4(b) and 4(d)). As in test 1a, the maximum BPF
decreases with increasing technology space complexity in both situations. It can be seen
that the maximum BPF that is reached in a world with project funding is higher than the
maximum BPF that is reached in a world without project funding. In addition, the negative
eﬀect of increasing technology space complexity is stronger in situations in which ﬁrms have
no venture capital. The gap between ﬁrms with and without project funding increases with
increasing technology space complexity. However, if ﬁrms get venture capital, the diﬀerence
between the maximum BPF reached in a world with and without project funding only exists
for more complex technology spaces. Also, it seems as if the decrease in the maximum BPF
in more complex technology spaces is smaller, if ﬁrms get venture capital. Besides the com-
plexity of the technology space, the amount of venture capital seems to have an important
impact on the maximum BPF that can be reached by the ﬁrms. Figure 4(c) and 4(d) show
that the number of innovations decreases with increasing technology space complexity, with
a stronger decrease in a world without project funding. In simpler technology spaces, ﬁrms
without project funding perform as good as ﬁrms with project funding. The more complex
the technology space gets, the greater becomes the gap between ﬁrms in a world with project
funding and ﬁrms in a world without project funding. With venture capital, the number of
innovations is not as aﬀected by increasing technology space complexity as without venture
capital. The number of innovations of ﬁrms in a world with project funding with venture cap-
ital almost seems stable, unaﬀected by increasing technology space complexity. This shows
again that additional ﬁnancial resources as venture capital seem to have an important impact
on the number of innovations that can be generated by the ﬁrms. Figure 4 shows that ﬁrms
in a world without project funding that have access to venture capital still perform worse
than ﬁrms in a world with project funding, however the gap in performance is smaller if ﬁrms
get venture capital.
9In this test, ﬁrms ’without’ venture capital actually get a negligible amount of capital that ensures
that these ﬁrms are not driven out of the market, even though they do not get enough venture capital to
successfully perform R&D.
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(a) The max best practice frontier (BPF) depen-
dent on technology space complexity without ven-
ture capital.
(b) The max best practice frontier (BPF) depen-
dent on technology space complexity with venture
capital.
(c) Number of innovations dependent on technol-
ogy space complexity without venture capital.
(d) Number of innovations dependent on technol-
ogy space complexity with venture capital.
Figure 4: Test 1b: The best practice frontier (BPF) and the number of innovations dependent
on technology space complexity and venture capital. Own ﬁgure.
Test 1c explores how the maximum best practice frontier and the number of innovations
change with increasing complexity of the technology space and with diﬀerent amounts of
venture capital, but high research grants in both situations. Of course, only ﬁrms in a world
with project funding that actually participate in projects get these high research grants. Test
1c is carried out as test 1b showed that the gap in performance between ﬁrms in a world with
and without project funding is smaller, if ﬁrms get venture capital. Therefore, this test aims
at investigating whether ﬁrms in a world without subsidized research projects can perform
as good as subsidized ﬁrms, if they have enough capital. Figure 5 compares the performance
of ﬁrms that have low venture capital, but high research grants (ﬁgure 5(a) and 5(c)) to the
performance of ﬁrms that have high venture capital and high research grants (ﬁgure 5(b) and
5(d)). The ﬁgure shows that, even though statistically signiﬁcant at a 5% level, the eﬀect of
technology space complexity on the maximum BPF in a world with project funding is very
small, if not negligible. So, the higher the ﬁnancial resources of the ﬁrm, the lower the eﬀect
of the resistance value on the BPF. In simple technology spaces, the maximum BPF is the
same for ﬁrms with and without project funding and the maximum BPF is not decreasing
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with increasing technology space complexity. With low venture capital, the more complex the
technology space gets, the worse ﬁrms without project funding perform compared to ﬁrms
with project funding. Firms in a world without project funding that receive high venture
capital perform almost as good as ﬁrms in a world with project funding that receive both high
venture capital and high grants, even if the technology space becomes increasingly complex.
This suggests that ﬁrms without project funding can perform as good as ﬁrms with project
funding if they get enough capital. Comparing the results of test 1b to the results of test
1c shows that this eﬀect gets more pronounced, the higher the capital of all ﬁrms is. Figure
5(c) and 5(d) show that the results for the number of innovations are relatively similar to
the results for the maximum BPF. Again, in a simple technology space there is almost no
diﬀerence in the performance of the ﬁrms. The more complex the technology space gets, the
greater becomes the diﬀerence in the number of innovations in a world with and without
project funding. This diﬀerence, however, decreases with higher venture capital, but not as
pronounced as the gap between the maximum BPFs. Figure 5 shows that higher ﬁnancial
resources can decrease the gap in performance between ﬁrms in a world with and without
project funding. This indicates that higher ﬁnancial resources can oﬀset the eﬀect of project
funding.
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(a) The max best practice frontier (BPF) depen-
dent on technology space complexity with low ven-
ture capital and high research grants.
(b) The max best practice frontier (BPF) depen-
dent on technology space complexity with high
venture capital and high research grants.
(c) Number of innovations dependent on technol-
ogy space complexity with low venture capital and
high research grants.
(d) Number of innovations dependent on technol-
ogy space complexity with high venture capital and
high research grants.
Figure 5: Test 1c: The best practice frontier (BPF) and the number of innovations dependent
on technology space complexity and venture capital and research grants. Own ﬁgure.
While Test 1 investigates diﬀerent outcomes of the model and their diﬀerence between
model runs with and without project funding, test 2 investigates diﬀerent outcomes of the
model exclusively in a world with project funding.
Test 2a investigates how the maximum best practice frontier (ﬁgure 6(a)) and the number
of innovations (ﬁgure 6(b)) change with increasing number of subsidized research projects and
with diﬀerent search radii. This is done to explore whether the eﬀect of an increasing number
of subsidized research projects on the maximum BPF and on the number of innovations is
diﬀerent with diﬀerent search radii. In ﬁgure 6, it can be seen that the number of subsidized
projects has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the maximum BPF, neither for high nor for low search
radii (ﬁgure 6(a)). There is also no signiﬁcant or only a very small eﬀect of the number of
projects on the number of innovations (ﬁgure 6(b)). Even though one might have expected
an increasing performance with an increasing number of subsidized projects, this appears
not to hold true in the model. However, independent of the number of research projects,
there is a huge diﬀerence in the innovative performance of ﬁrms with high and low search
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radius. Both the maximum BPF and the number of innovations are higher for ﬁrms with a
lower search radius than for ﬁrms with a higher search radius. This result is in line with the
results of test 1a, i.e. ﬁrms with lower search radius perform better than ﬁrms with higher
search radius, independent of the number of subsidized projects. Following the results of this
test, it would be more proﬁtable for the government to inﬂuence ﬁrms’ search radius than to
increase the number of subsidized projects.
(a) The max best practice frontier (BPF) depen-
dent on number of subsidized projects and search
radius.
(b) The number of innovations dependent on num-
ber of subsidized projects and search radius.
Figure 6: Test 2a: The best practice frontier (BPF) and the number of innovations dependent
on the number of subsidized projects and search radius. Own ﬁgure.
Test 2b investigates how the maximum best practice frontier (ﬁgure 7(a)) and the number
of innovations (ﬁgure 7(b)) change with increasing number of subsidized research projects in
a situation with and without venture capital. This helps make statements about whether an
increasing number of subsidized projects aﬀects innovative performance diﬀerently, if ﬁrms
have diﬀerent ﬁnancial resources. Figure 7 shows that the number of subsidized projects has
no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the maximum BPF reached by ﬁrms in the model, neither without nor
with some venture capital. Concerning the number of innovations in the model, the number of
projects has a small, but still signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on the innovations generated by ﬁrms.
The number of innovations decreases with increasing number of projects for both situations
with and without venture capital. This is an interesting result as subsidized research projects
are supposed to stimulate and not hinder innovations. Surprisingly, the number of subsidized
projects in the model has no or only a small negative eﬀect on innovative performance.
22
(a) The max best practice frontier (BPF) depen-
dent on number of subsidized projects and venture
capital.
(b) The number of innovations dependent on num-
ber of subsidized projects and venture capital.
Figure 7: Test 2b: The best practice frontier (BPF) and the number of innovations dependent
on the number of subsidized projects and venture capital. Own ﬁgure.
Test 2c investigates how the maximum best practice frontier (ﬁgure 8(a)) and the number
of innovations (ﬁgure 8(b)) change with increasing number of subsidized research projects
and with diﬀerent amounts of venture capital (but high research grants). This is done to
investigate whether the eﬀect of subsidized projects can also be achieved for ﬁrms without
project funding by increasing their venture capital. Figure 8 shows that, as already shown by
test 2b before, there is no diﬀerence in the height of the maximum BPF of ﬁrms with diﬀerent
amounts of venture capital. Even though test 1c showed that venture capital can compensate
for project funding, this appears to only hold true for the diﬀerence between ﬁrms with and
without project funding. Comparing ﬁrms in worlds in which both have access to project
funding, there is no big diﬀerence in performance due to a diﬀerence in venture capital.
Again, the eﬀect of the number of projects is only very small, but signiﬁcantly negative,
independent of ﬁrms’ venture capital.
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(a) The max best practice frontier (BPF) depen-
dent on number of subsidized projects and venture
capital and research grants.
(b) The number of innovations dependent on num-
ber of subsidized projects and venture capital and
research grants.
Figure 8: Test 2c: The best practice frontier (BPF) and the number of innovations dependent
on the number of subsidized projects and venture capital and research grants. Own ﬁgure.
Summing up, test 1 and 2 lead to some important results. First, ﬁrms’ performances
decrease with increasing technology space complexity. Second, ﬁrms in a world with project
funding perform better than ﬁrms in a world without project funding. Third, the number
of subsidized research projects does not aﬀect ﬁrms’ innovative performance in terms of
the maximum BPF, the only eﬀect that can be seen is a small decrease in the number of
innovations if the number of subsidized projects increases. Fourth, it appears as if the decrease
in performance resulting from an increase in technology space complexity can be oﬀset by
an increase in venture capital. The same holds true for the worse performance of ﬁrms that
are not participating in subsidized research projects. Fifth, independent of technology space
complexity and the number of subsidized research projects, a higher search radius leads to a
poorer performance for both worlds with and without project funding.
4.3 Further Analysis
While test 1 and test 2 are analyzing innovative performance in the narrow sense of the word,
test 3 and test 4 do not analyze the eﬀect of parameter changes on innovative performance,
but they analyze the eﬀect of parameter changes on mean trajectory changes. Therefore, in
this paper these tests are not included in the sensitivity analysis, but in a further analysis.
Test 3 investigates how the eﬀect of an increase in technology space complexity on ﬁrms’
mean trajectory changes is aﬀected by diﬀerent search radii (test 3a), by diﬀerent ﬁnancial
resources (test 3b) and by diﬀerent ﬁnancial resources, but equal research grants (test 3c).
The test compares the results of ﬁrms in a world with project funding to the results of ﬁrms in
a world without project funding. Test 4 analyzes how the eﬀect of an increase in the number
of subsidized projects on ﬁrms’ mean trajectory changes is inﬂuenced by diﬀerent search
radii (test 4a), by diﬀerent ﬁnancial resources (test 4b) and by diﬀerent ﬁnancial resources,
but equal research grants (test 4c). The tests investigates these eﬀects only in a world with
project funding.
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Mean trajectory changes measure how often ﬁrms move between diﬀerent technological
niches or ﬁelds to perform R&D. This is an important measure as the trajectory change
gives information about whether project funding helps make ﬁrms move between diﬀerent
technological ﬁelds which can lead to knowledge spillovers in other industries by creating
chain-links. Firms that perform R&D in diﬀerent technological niches with diﬀerent partners
from other technological ﬁelds are more likely to combine diﬀerent kinds of knowledge and
possibly create not only incremental but also radical innovations. But, as already stated
above, ﬁrms that change their technological niche too often could be outperformed by ﬁrms
that are more ’focused’. The relationship between innovative performance and trajectory
changes and how both interact is an important topic, but, due to limited space, subject
to further research. However, by simply comparing the eﬀects of parameter changes on
innovative performance and on trajectory changes, it can be seen that the eﬀects are always
contradictory.
Test 3a investigates how the mean trajectory change varies with increasing complexity of
the technology space and with low search radius (ﬁgure 9(a)) and high search radius (ﬁgure
9(b)). This is done to investigate whether ﬁrms that have a higher search radius change their
technological niche more often than ﬁrms that have a lower search radius and how this is
aﬀected by project participation. Figure 9 shows that the mean trajectory change of ﬁrms
in a world with project funding is relatively stable, even with increasing technology space
complexity. The eﬀect of an increasing technology space complexity on the mean trajectory
change of ﬁrms in a world with project funding therefore is almost negligible. This result holds
true for both high and low search radius. In contrast, the mean trajectory changes of ﬁrms
in a world without project funding increase with increasing technology space complexity for
both high and low search radius, with a higher increase with a lower search radius. However,
even though statistically signiﬁcant, this eﬀect still is very low. For both worlds, with and
without project funding, the mean trajectory changes are signiﬁcantly higher for ﬁrms with
a higher search radius.
(a) Mean trajectory change of ﬁrms dependent on
technology space complexity with low search ra-
dius.
(b) Mean trajectory change of ﬁrms dependent on
technology space complexity with high search ra-
dius.
Figure 9: Test 3a: Trajectory change dependent on technology space complexity and search
radius. Own ﬁgure.
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Test 3b investigates how the mean trajectory change varies with increasing complexity
of the technology space in a situation with venture capital (ﬁgure 10(b)) as well as without
venture capital (ﬁgure 10(a)). This is done to explore whether venture capital has an inﬂuence
on how often ﬁrms change their technological niche. Figure 10 shows that, in contrast to test
3a, the mean trajectory changes are relatively similar for both situations with and without
venture capital. Again, the mean trajectory changes of ﬁrms in a world with project funding
are relatively stable even in complex technology spaces. As before, the mean trajectory
changes of ﬁrms in a world without project funding increase with increasing technology
space complexity, with a higher increase in the situation without venture capital.
(a) Mean trajectory change of ﬁrms dependent on
technology space complexity without venture cap-
ital.
(b) Mean trajectory change of ﬁrms dependent on
technology space complexity with venture capital.
Figure 10: Test 3b: Trajectory change dependent on technology space complexity and venture
capital. Own ﬁgure.
Test 3c investigates how the mean trajectory changes vary with increasing complexity of
the technology space and with low venture capital, but high research grants (ﬁgure 13(a))
and with high venture capital and high research grants (ﬁgure 13(b)). This is done to make
statements about whether venture capital can compensate for project funding. Figure 13
shows almost the same results as ﬁgure 12, the mean trajectory changes of ﬁrms with project
funding are not aﬀected by an increase in technology space complexity, neither with high
nor with low venture capital. The mean trajectory changes of ﬁrms without project funding
increase with increasing technology space complexity and the eﬀect in a case with low venture
capital is almost two times the size of the eﬀect in a case with high venture capital.
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(a) Mean trajectory change of ﬁrms dependent on
technology space complexity with low venture cap-
ital and high research grants.
(b) Mean trajectory change of ﬁrms dependent
on technology space complexity with high venture
capital and high research grants.
Figure 11: Test 3c: Trajectory change dependent on technology space complexity and venture
capital and research grants. Own ﬁgure.
Test 4 investigates how an increasing number of subsidized projects aﬀects ﬁrms’ mean
trajectory changes. The test investigates the impact of the search radius on the eﬀect of
project funding (ﬁgure 12(a)), the impact of venture capital on the eﬀect of project funding
(ﬁgure 12(b)) and the impact of venture capital and research grants on the eﬀect of project
funding (ﬁgure 12(c)). This is done to investigate whether politicians can inﬂuence how
often ﬁrms change their technological niches by increasing the number of subsidized research
projects or by inﬂuencing one of the other parameters named above. As ﬁgure 12 shows,
the mean trajectory changes of ﬁrms seem to be relatively independent of the number of
research projects. The eﬀect of an increase in the number of projects is either statistically
not signiﬁcant or almost zero. In addition, ﬁrms’ mean trajectory changes do not diﬀer, even
though their ﬁnancial resources diﬀer. The only thing that has a huge inﬂuence on ﬁrms’
mean trajectory changes is the search radius. Firms with a higher search radius change their
technological niche more often than ﬁrms with a lower search radius.
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(a) Test 4a: Mean trajectory change dependent on
number of subsidized projects and search radius.
(b) Test 4b: Mean trajectory change dependent on
number of subsidized projects and venture capital.
(c) Test 4c: Mean trajectory change dependent on
number of subsidized projects and venture capital
and research grants.
Figure 12: Test 4: Trajectory change dependent on the number of subsidized projects, on
the search radius, on venture capital and on research grants. Own ﬁgure.
Summing up, test 3 and 4 show that the mean trajectory changes of ﬁrms in a world with
project funding are relatively independent of increasing technology space complexity, whereas
the mean trajectory changes of ﬁrms in a world without project funding show a small increase
with increasing technology space complexity. The number of subsidized research projects has
only little, if not no inﬂuence on how often ﬁrms change their technological niche. For both
increasing technology space complexity and increasing number of subsidized projects, ﬁrms
with a higher search radius change their technological niche more often than ﬁrms with a
lower search radius.
4.4 Discussion
The four tests applied in this paper and presented in the previous two subsections aim at
investigating the eﬀects of project funding on ﬁrms’ innovative performance. Test 1 and 2
lead to three main results.
First, ﬁrms’ innovative performance decreases with increasing technology space complex-
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ity. This result is not surprising at all. The more complex the technology space gets, the
more ﬁnancial resources and the more time ﬁrms need to successfully perform R&D. Firms
need more ﬁnancial resources as the cells’ resistance values are higher in a more complex
technology space. Higher resistance values imply higher ’costs’ to switch the cells’ state.
Firms need more time as they have to stop performing R&D as soon as they have no ﬁnan-
cial resources left. Firms that already spent all their resources (which can easily happen in
a complex technology space) cannot successfully perform R&D until they have waited long
enough to get access to other ﬁnancial resources as, for instance, to venture capital.
Second, ﬁrms in a world with project funding outperform ﬁrms in a world without project
funding. This result becomes even more pronounced as the technology space complexity
increases. The second result is easily understood if one understands the reason for the ﬁrst
result. In contrast to ﬁrms in a world without project funding, ﬁrms in a world with project
funding have access to those additional ﬁnancial resources that allow them to bear higher
resistance values or ’costs’ in a more complex technology space and they don’t have to stop
their R&D activities when ﬁrms without project funding have. In a world with project
funding, even ﬁrms that are not participating in subsidized projects beneﬁt from technology
or knowledge spillovers, which increases performance of the economy as a whole. This also
explains the third result.
Third, if all ﬁrms already have the possibility to perform in subsidized projects, a further
increase in ﬁnancial resources by an increase in subsidized projects does not lead to a better
performance in terms of the maximum BPF and the number of innovations. This is the case
as ﬁrms always need at least one period to successfully perform R&D on a technological
ﬁeld. Therefore, more ﬁnancial resources do not increase ﬁrms’ performance anymore. If
project subsidies are already suﬃcient, more projects (and therefore more ﬁnancial resources)
cannot help reduce cells’ resistance values faster. One could say that even though additional
ﬁnancial resources signiﬁcantly foster innovative activities, this works only to a certain degree.
Knowledge and new technologies still have to be understood and integrated. It even can be
that with increasing number of projects the number of innovations decreases. This happens
as with too many projects ﬁrms start ’project hopping’ or ’technology hopping’ and stop
increasing the ﬁtness of their own technological niche. This means that ﬁrms participate
in all subsidized projects within their search radius, no matter if these projects subsidize
technologies that are less developed than their own technology. In this case, too many
subsidized research projects in the ﬁrm’s radius disturb the technological trajectories the ﬁrm
would have followed in a world without project funding. In addition, if ﬁrms are participating
in projects that are far away from their own technology stock, it even can be that these
ﬁrms cannot connect this knowledge to their technology stock. So, they cannot produce an
innovation.
Explaining these three main results helps to guide further research and to make policy
recommendations concerning the eﬃciency and necessity of subsidized research projects. If
the results of this model imply that the advantage of subsidized projects exclusively comes
through more ﬁnancial resources, then ﬁrms in a world without project funding have to be
able to perform as good as ﬁrms in a world with project funding, if they have enough ﬁnancial
resources. This is exactly what the model results showed. The decrease in performance
(of ﬁrms both in a world with and without project funding) resulting from an increase in
technology space complexity can be oﬀset by an increase in venture capital. The same holds
true for the worse performance of ﬁrms that are not participating in subsidized research
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projects compared to the performance of ﬁrms that are participating in subsidized research
projects. This shows that, at least in the model world, ﬁrms in a complex technology space
can perform as good as they can in a simple technology space and they can perform as
good without project funding as they can with project funding, if they get enough ﬁnancial
resources. The results indicate that the eﬀect of project funding is simply a ﬁnancial one.
This leads to the question whether other policy instruments as, for instance, institutional
funding would lead to the same or even to better results than project funding. Another
interesting result shows that a higher search radius leads to a poorer innovative performance
(in contradiction to the results of Silverberg/ Verspagen [2005]). This is the case as ﬁrms with
a higher search radius perform R&D in many diﬀerent, unrelated ﬁelds. These ﬁelds are far
away from the ﬁrms’ technology stocks. Therefore, these ﬁrms are not able to connect the new
knowledge to their knowledge stock and to generate innovations with this knowledge. This is
in line with the neo-Schumpeterian idea that knowledge builds on already existing knowledge
and cannot be simply ’used’ by everyone. If the only observable eﬀect is that project funding
increases ﬁrms’ innovative performance, as it increases ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial resources, it has to be
questioned if project funding aﬀects other parameters. Test 3 and 4 investigate whether ﬁrms’
mean trajectory changes could be one of the other parameters aﬀected by project funding.
Test 3 and 4 lead to four main results. To be able to interpret these results, it has to be
kept in mind that how often ﬁrms change their technological niches depends on the largest
part on the search radius, the search for projects radius and whether or not ﬁrms actually
participate in projects. The higher the search radius, the lower the probability of a single cell
to be chosen, but the higher the probability of a ﬁrm to change its technological niche. The
probability of a ﬁrm with search radius rs = 1 to change its technological niche is 40%, the
probability of a ﬁrm with search radius rs = 2 to change its technological niche is higher than
60% and the probability of a ﬁrm with search radius rs = 3 to change its technological niche
is higher than 70%. Regarding this explanation, the ﬁrst three results are not surprising.
First, for both increasing technology space complexity and increasing number of subsidized
projects, ﬁrms with a higher search radius change their technological niche more often. This
can be easily explained. As a higher search radius increases the probability to change the
technological niche, ﬁrms with a higher search radius change their niche more often.
Second, the mean trajectory changes of ﬁrms in a world with project funding are rela-
tively independent of increasing technology space complexity. This is due to the fact that,
if ﬁrms have enough ﬁnancial resources, ﬁrms’ search radius is the decisive factor that is
able to inﬂuence the mean trajectory changes. If ﬁrms have enough capital to percolate
goal-directed through the technology space, only the search radius inﬂuences ﬁrms’ mean
trajectory changes. There are cases in which ﬁrms’ search radius is not the only factor able
to inﬂuence trajectory changes, one of these cases is explained in result 4.
Third, the number of subsidized research projects only has little to no inﬂuence on how
often ﬁrms change their technological niche. As trajectory changes are dependent on the
search radius, and as the search radius for projects rs projects has at least the size as the
’standard’ search radius rs, ﬁrms in a world with subsidized projects theoretically change
their technological niche more often, as their probability to change their niche is higher.
However, the increase in the number of trajectory changes is only marginal, as there are not
enough projects in the model to aﬀect the search radii of all ﬁrms. Therefore, the small eﬀect
almost appears as if there actually is no eﬀect. The only result that cannot be explained by
the search radius is the fourth result.
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Fourth, the mean trajectory changes of ﬁrms in a world without project funding slightly
increase with increasing technology space complexity. This result can be explained by the
fact that to successfully change a cell’s state ﬁrms in more complex technology spaces have to
perform R&D on more lattice cells in more periods than they have to do in simpler technology
spaces. As ﬁrms in complex technology spaces often cannot reduce a cell’s resistance value
in one period, they have to reduce the resistance value of this or another cell in their search
radius in the next periods. To put it simple, the more complex the technology space is, the
more diﬃcult it is for the ﬁrms to percolate goal-directed through the technology space and
the more the ﬁrms have to try many diﬀerent paths. This is in line with the second result.
As ﬁrms in a world with project funding have higher ﬁnancial resources, they can percolate
more goal-directed through the technology space and they do not need to try many diﬀerent
paths to the left or to the right. Therefore, these ﬁrms are not as aﬀected by technology
space complexity as ﬁrms in a world without project funding.
Summing up, given the architecture of the model and the deﬁnition of innovation in the
model, the outcomes resulting from test 1, 2, 3 and 4 are not surprising. Following the model
results of this simple basic model, the only way government can inﬂuence ﬁrms’ innovative
performance is to provide suﬃcient ﬁnancial resources (which can be by project funding or
other policy instruments) and to inﬂuence ﬁrms’ search radius.
5 Summary and Conclusion
In Germany, the Federal Government spends more than seven billion Euro a year on direct
project funding (DPF) to correct for market failure [BMBF, 2014g]. Market failure occurs
because knowledge is a ’latent public good’ [Nelson, 1989]. The public good features of
knowledge lead to positive externalities. Due to these externalities, there exist technological
regions or ﬁelds in which ﬁrms invest less in R&D than the socially optimal amount [Arena
et al., 2012, p. 274/275]. As a result, the German Federal Government subsidizes research
projects in ’desirable’ ﬁelds as in the ﬁelds of climate and energy, health and nutrition,
mobility, security and communication [BMBF, 2014a]. However, project funding costs billions
of Euro and in a world that faces shrinking government budgets and international competition
"knowing and increasing the eﬃciency of innovation policies has become crucial" [Aschhoﬀ,
2008, p. i]. This is particularly the case as the eﬀects of project funding can be both positive
and negative. Hence, the evaluation of these diﬀerent eﬀects of project funding is of utmost
importance. Therefore, in this paper, the eﬀects of subsidized research projects on ﬁrms’
innovative performance have been investigated by using an agent-based percolation model.
The model results show that ﬁrms in a world with project funding outperform ﬁrms in a
world without project funding in terms of the maximum BPF and the number of innovations.
In addition, the innovative performance of ﬁrms in a less complex technology space is signif-
icantly higher than the innovative performance of ﬁrms in a more complex technology space.
Therefore, it is not surprising that the gap in performance between ﬁrms in a world with and
without project funding increases with increasing technology space complexity. However, this
diﬀerence in performance can only be observed between ﬁrms in a world with and without
project funding. If all ﬁrms have the possibility to participate in subsidized research projects,
there is no diﬀerence in the ﬁrms’ performances, even if the ﬁrms diﬀer in the amount of their
ﬁnancial resources. Also an increasing number of subsidized projects has no (positive) eﬀect
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on ﬁrms’ innovative performance. One of the most important results of the model is that
additional ﬁnancial resources, e.g. resulting from venture capital, can substitute for project
funding. Hence, the positive eﬀects of subsidized projects on innovative performance can
also be achieved in a world without project funding if ﬁrms have access to other ﬁnancial
resources. This result indicates that, at least in the model, the eﬀect of project funding on
innovative performance is a purely ﬁnancial one.
The model results lead to the following conclusions. The more complex the technology
space gets, the more eﬀective and important subsidized research projects are. But, to avoid a
waste of resources, the number of subsidized projects has to be regimented. In addition and
not surprising, the more ﬁnancial resources ﬁrms already have, the less important subsidized
research projects are. Furthermore, at least in the model, policy intervention can even
lead to negative results if too many subsidized projects disturb ﬁrms’ paths through the
technology space. Even though the model shows that ﬁrms have to be supported by additional
ﬁnancial resources the more complex the technology space gets, these ﬁnancial resources do
not necessarily have to come from project funding. In addition, as project funding only
subsidizes certain technological ﬁelds for a short period of time, ﬁrms participate in a project
to get additional ﬁnancial resources. Subsidized projects do not necessarily inﬂuence ﬁrms’
trajectory changes or ﬁrms’ long-term path through the technology space. This leads to
the question whether project funding can achieve its goal to foster innovations in socially
desirable ﬁelds. Even though the ﬁrms perform R&D on subsidized ﬁelds, this does not
automatically imply that they create innovations in these ﬁelds.
Summing up, subsidized research projects can have both positive and negative eﬀects.
As the model shows that the positive eﬀects of project funding can also be achieved with
additional capital from other sources (e.g. venture capital, institutional funding), further
research is necessary to decide whether or not the beneﬁts of project funding do outweigh
its costs. One research question could be whether the eﬀects of direct project funding could
also be achieved with institutional funding or other policy instruments or if diﬀerent forms
of funding do even lead to better results than project funding does.
Regarding these results, it has to be kept in mind what kind of model we have and what
limitations we face. The most important aspect is that this model represents a simple basic
model that was created to show how such an agent-based percolation model can possibly look
like. Therefore, this model aims at being an inspiration for creating a more elaborate model.
Besides this aspect, there are other aspects that have to be regarded. On the one hand, it has
to be questioned whether this model is the right model for the underlying research problem.
On the other hand, it has to be questioned whether this model has been built right to answer
the research question. We face the question of validation and veriﬁcation.
Concerning the validation of the model, the ﬁrst critique could be that R&D and the
search for new knowledge in reality do not take place as assumed in the model. The as-
sumption that ﬁrms percolate more or less goal directed from the bottom to the top could
be expanded or replaced by the assumption that ﬁrms percolate from diﬀerent centers in
the model through the technology space. Here, ﬁtness could be measured as the number of
patches away from the technological origin and not as the height of the technological frontier.
In addition, the dimension of the model should be expanded as the technology space is far
from being a two-dimensional lattice space. The second critique could be the way in which
innovations are deﬁned and measured in the model. The model is not able to diﬀerentiate
between diﬀerent innovations, but assumes that all innovations in all niches are of the same
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relevance. Here, one has to think about how to incorporate diﬀerent kinds of innovations,
maybe by measuring breakthrough or radical innovations in terms of ﬁrms that are able to
change the state of many diﬀerent patches by one step. The third aspect that can be criti-
cized is the deﬁnition of innovative performance in the model. As innovative performance is
measured by an increase in the BPF, ﬁrms that move to the left or to the right are ’less inno-
vative’ and ﬁrms that always stay in their niche and move goal-directed are more innovative.
This assumption excludes breakthrough or cross-industry innovations and implies that inno-
vations can only happen by marginally improving already existing technology. This could
be improved by incorporating percolation through the model as already suggested. If ﬁrms
start from diﬀerent places of a more-dimensional world and percolate in diﬀerent directions
of this world, height would not be the only decisive factor. More important could be the
distance from the technological origin (independent of the direction). The reader has to be
aware that the outcomes that resulted from the model hinge on the way in which movement
through the technology space and innovations in the technology space are deﬁned. These
results cannot be regarded and interpreted in isolation.
Concerning the veriﬁcation of the model, one has to diﬀerentiate between the basic model
and the model with project funding. In the basic model, the ﬁrst aspect that could be criti-
cized is the homogeneity of the actors in the model. Even though one of the big advantages
of ABM is the possibility to work with heterogeneous actors, the model does not make use
of this possibility. As we are interested in the eﬀect of project funding on diﬀerent actors
as ﬁrms, universities and research organizations, further research should expand the model
by heterogeneous actors with diﬀerent network competencies, diﬀerent sizes and diﬀerent
absorptive capacities. This would lead to the possibility to investigate the eﬀect of project
funding on the innovative performance of diﬀerent actors and to analyze whether the eﬀect is
diﬀerent for diﬀerent actors. The second aspect that could be criticized is the fact that even
though ﬁrms work on the same cells at the same time, they do not cooperate in the narrow
sense. However, incorporating cooperation in the model and investigating cooperation in
the model could lead to completely diﬀerent results. Regarding the model with subsidized
projects, one point of critique is the assumption that all ﬁrms with a subsidized project in
their neighborhood can actually participate in a project. However, this is not the case in re-
ality. Not all actors have access to project funding due to self-selection or picking-the-winner
behavior of the government. Empirics show that only 15% of all innovative actors participate
in subsidized research projects [Handelsblatt, 2009]. Further research should also incorporate
into the model that ﬁrms act at least bounded rational, i.e. they would not participate in
research projects if the grant does not outweigh the R&D costs. As in the basic model, ﬁrms
in the model with subsidized research projects do not really cooperate, but simply work on
the same project at the same time. Again, this has to be improved by further research. In
addition, the subsidized research projects could be deﬁned more precisely by deﬁning the
number of ﬁrms that are allowed to participate in one project, by deﬁning how many actors
from diﬀerent groups can participate in one project, by deﬁning the duration of a project or
even by incorporating preferential attachment.
In addition to the validation and the veriﬁcation of the model, there is another aspect
that has to be emphasized. This paper exclusively investigates the eﬀect of project funding
on innovative performance. However, innovative performance is not the only aspect that
can be inﬂuenced by project funding. The instrument of project funding also positively
inﬂuences joint research eﬀorts, especially between diﬀerent partners. These joint research
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eﬀorts are known to have additional positive eﬀects on the innovative performance of ﬁrms in
an economy [Herstad et al., 2013, p. 495]. Moreover, the knowledge generated in subsidized
projects is not kept secret but communicated to the public, which also has positive eﬀects
from a welfare point of view. To sum up, even if a more elaborate model can lead to valid
results, innovative performance as measured in the model must never be analyzed in isolation.
As the model presented in this paper is a simple basic model, there are numerous possibil-
ities for further research. The most important task would be to extend the model as already
suggested above to make it more realistic. This has to be done to investigate whether the
eﬀects of project funding on innovative performance are diﬀerent in a more elaborate model.
Furthermore, the model could be extended with real-world data and many diﬀerent eﬀects
could be investigated and confronted with the results of econometric analysis.
The results of the model analyzed in this paper show that, despite the promising ap-
proach of agent-based modeling gains in importance in innovation economics, much research
still needs to be done. Notwithstanding, the development of computer-aided tools for data
evaluation and research as well as the movement away from neoclassical assumptions in com-
bination with an increase in network thinking will lead to a signiﬁcant change in how research
in innovation economics takes place in the future. Therefore, the approach of agent-based
modeling is a ﬁrst step to not only improve the models, methods and tools used in innovation
economics, but also to facilitate a change in mind of innovation researchers.
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Parameters Typical Model Run
steps 20*100
no. of ﬁrms 30
mean resistance 15




payoﬀ per inno. 35




Test 1: Eﬀect of technology space complexity on max BPF and number of innovations.
Test 1a: Eﬀect of technology space complexity on max BPF and number of innovations
dependent on search radius.
Test 1b: Eﬀect of technology space complexity on max BPF and number of innovations
dependent on venture capital.
Test 1c: Eﬀect of technology space complexity on max BPF and number of innovations
dependent on venture capital and research grants.
Test 2: Eﬀect of number of projects on max BPF and number of innovations.
Test 2a: Eﬀect of number of projects on max BPF and number of innovations dependent
on search radius.
Test 2b: Eﬀect of number of projects on max BPF and number of innovations dependent
on venture capital.
Test 2c: Eﬀect of number of projects on max BPF and number of innovations dependent
on venture capital and research grants.





Test 3: Eﬀect of technology space complexity on mean trajectory change.
Test 3a: Eﬀect of technology space complexity on mean trajectory change dependent on
search radius.
Test 3b: Eﬀect of technology space complexity on mean trajectory change dependent on
venture capital.
Test 3c: Eﬀect of technology space complexity on mean trajectory change dependent on
venture capital and research grants.
Test 4: Eﬀect of number of projects on mean trajectory change.
Test 4a: Eﬀect of number of projects on mean trajectory change dependent on search
radius.
Test 4b: Eﬀect of number of projects on mean trajectory change dependent on venture
capital.
Test 4c: Eﬀect of number of projects on mean trajectory change dependent on venture
capital and research grants.























































































































































































































































































































































































































Test β p− value R2 adj.R2
1a (a) - max BPF basic -3,66 0,00 0,95 0,94
1a (a) - max BPF project -0,97 0,00 0,75 0,73
1a (b) - max BPF basic -3,33 0,00 0,82 0,80
1a (b) - max BPF project -1,98 0,00 0,89 0,88
1a (a) - no. of inno. basic -33,96 0,00 0,90 0,90
1a (a) - no. of inno. project -5,27 0,00 0,89 0,88
1a (b) - no. of inno. basic -30,76 0,00 0,91 0,90
1a (b) - no. of inno. project -5,65 0,00 0,85 0,83
1b (a) - max BPF basic -3,71 0,00 0,91 0,90
1b (a) - max BPF project -1,51 0,00 0,82 0,81
1b (b) - max BPF basic -2,35 0,00 0,88 0,86
1b (b) - max BPF project -0,33 0,00 0,51 0,47
1b (a) - no. of inno. basic -73,18 0,00 0,92 0,92
1b (a) - no. of inno. project -28,05 0,00 0,82 0,80
1b (b) - no. of inno. basic -33,23 0,00 0,86 0,85
1b (b) - no. of inno. project -4,00 0,00 0,68 0,65
1c (a) - max BPF basic -3,22 0,00 0,93 0,93
1c (a) - max BPF project -0,29 0,00 0,64 0,61
1c (b) - max BPF basic -0,68 0,00 0,77 0,74
1c (b) - max BPF project -0,12 0,00 0,64 0,60
1c (a) - no. of inno. basic -73,18 0,00 0,93 0,92
1c (a) - no. of inno. project -11,37 0,00 0,77 0,75
1c (b) - no. of inno. basic -32,17 0,00 0,88 0,87
1c (b) - no. of inno. project -3,01 0,00 0,55 0,51
Table 6: Test statistics for test 1. Own table.
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Appendix - D2
Test β p− value R2 adj.R2
2a (a) - low SR -0,00 0,04 0,50 0,42
2a (a) - high SR -0,01 0,05 0,49 0,40
2a (b) - low SR -0,57 0,00 0,85 0,83
2a (b) - high SR -0,02 0,00 0,03 0,00
2b (a) - low VC -0,00 0,10 0,37 0,26
2b (a) - high VC -0,00 0,22 0,23 0,11
2b (b) - low VC -0,97 0,00 0,82 0,80
2b (b) - high VC -0,80 0,00 0,76 0,72
2c (a) - low VC -0,00 0,06 0,47 0,36
2c (a) - high VC -0,00 0,06 0,44 0,35
2c (b) - low VC -0,75 0,00 0,86 0,84
2c (b) - high VC -0,67 0,00 0,72 0,67
Table 7: Test statistics for test 2. Own table.
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Appendix - D3
Test β p− value R2 adj.R2
3a (a) - basic 0,20 0,00 0,87 0,86
3a (a) - project 0,04 0,00 0,50 0,45
3a (b) - basic 0,11 0,00 0,90 0,90
3a (b) - project 0,02 0,00 0,50 0,45
3b (a) - basic 0,27 0,00 0,95 0,95
3b (a) - project 0,08 0,00 0,80 0,78
3b (b) - basic 0,15 0,00 0,90 0,89
3b (b) - project 0,01 0,03 0,34 0,28
3c (a) - basic 0,27 0,00 0,95 0,95
3c (a) - project 0,01 0,04 0,31 0,25
3c (b) - basic 0,15 0,00 0,87 0,85
3c (b) - project 0,01 0,25 0,11 0,03
4a (a) - low SR 0,01 0,00 0,84 0,82
4a (a) - high SR -0,00 0,83 0,00 0,00
4b (b) - low VC 0,01 0,00 0,83 0,80
4b (b) - high VC 0,02 0,00 0,92 0,91
4c (c) - low VC 0,00 0,05 0,48 0,40
4c (c) - high VC 0,01 0,00 0,92 0,91
Table 8: Test statistics for test 3 and 4. Own table.
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DER DEUTSCHEN STADT- UND LANDKREISE (1999-2008) 
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42-2012 Benjamin Schön,  
Andreas Pyka 
 
A TAXONOMY OF INNOVATION NETWORKS IK 
 
43-2012 Dirk Foremny, 
Nadine Riedel 
 
BUSINESS TAXES AND THE ELECTORAL CYCLE        ECO 
44-2012 Gisela Di Meglio, 
Andreas Pyka and 
Luis Rubalcaba 
 
VARIETIES OF SERVICE ECONOMIES IN EUROPE        IK 
45-2012 Ralf Rukwid,  
Julian P. Christ 
INNOVATIONSPOTENTIALE IN BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG: 
PRODUKTIONSCLUSTER IM BEREICH „METALL, ELEKTRO, IKT“ 
UND REGIONALE VERFÜGBARKEIT AKADEMISCHER 
FACHKRÄFTE IN DEN MINT-FÄCHERN 
 
IK 
46-2012 Julian P. Christ,  
Ralf Rukwid 
INNOVATIONSPOTENTIALE IN BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG: 
BRANCHENSPEZIFISCHE FORSCHUNGS- UND 
ENTWICKLUNGSAKTIVITÄT, REGIONALES 
PATENTAUFKOMMEN UND BESCHÄFTIGUNGSSTRUKTUR 
 
       IK 
47-2012 Oliver Sauter ASSESSING UNCERTAINTY IN EUROPE AND THE 
US - IS THERE A COMMON FACTOR? 
       ECO 
48-2012 Dominik Hartmann SEN MEETS SCHUMPETER. INTRODUCING STRUCTURAL AND 
DYNAMIC ELEMENTS INTO THE HUMAN CAPABILITY 
APPROACH 
 





DISTAL EMBEDDING AS A TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION 
NETWORK FORMATION STRATEGY 
       IK 
50-2012 Martyna Marczak, 
Víctor Gómez 
CYCLICALITY OF REAL WAGES IN THE USA AND GERMANY: 
NEW INSIGHTS FROM WAVELET ANALYSIS 
       ECO 
51-2012 André P. Slowak DIE DURCHSETZUNG VON SCHNITTSTELLEN 
IN DER STANDARDSETZUNG: 
FALLBEISPIEL LADESYSTEM ELEKTROMOBILITÄT 






WHY IT MATTERS WHAT PEOPLE THINK - BELIEFS, LEGAL 
ORIGINS AND THE DEEP ROOTS OF TRUST 








STATISTISCHER ÜBERBLICK DER TÜRKISCHEN MIGRATION IN 
BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG UND DEUTSCHLAND 






Andreas Pyka, Seda 
Aydin, Lena Klauß, 
Fabian Stahl, Ali 
Santircioglu, Silvia 
Oberegelsbacher, 
Sheida Rashidi, Gaye 
Onan and Suna 
Erginkoç 
 
IDENTIFIZIERUNG UND ANALYSE DEUTSCH-TÜRKISCHER 
INNOVATIONSNETZWERKE. ERSTE ERGEBNISSE DES TGIN-
PROJEKTES 






Tobias Börger and 
Oliver Frör 
 
THE ECOLOGICAL PRICE OF GETTING RICH IN A GREEN 




        
ECO 







FAIRNESS CONSIDERATIONS IN LABOR UNION WAGE 
SETTING – A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 







INTEGRATION DURCH WÄHRUNGSUNION? 
DER FALL DER EURO-ZONE 





Sibylle H. Lehmann 
 
TAKING FIRMS TO THE STOCK MARKET:  
IPOS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF LARGE BANKS IN IMPERIAL 
GERMANY 1896-1913 
        
ECO 
 
59-2012 Sibylle H. Lehmann, 
Philipp Hauber and 
Alexander Opitz 
 
POLITICAL RIGHTS, TAXATION, AND FIRM VALUATION – 
EVIDENCE FROM SAXONY AROUND 1900 
ECO        
 
60-2012 Martyna Marczak, 
Víctor Gómez 
SPECTRAN, A SET OF MATLAB PROGRAMS FOR SPECTRAL 
ANALYSIS 
ECO        
 
61-2012 Theresa Lohse, 
Nadine Riedel 
THE IMPACT OF TRANSFER PRICING REGULATIONS ON 
PROFIT SHIFTING WITHIN EUROPEAN MULTINATIONALS 









































Nr. Autor Titel CC 
 
62-2013 Heiko Stüber REAL WAGE CYCLICALITY OF NEWLY HIRED WORKERS ECO        
 
63-2013 David E. Bloom, 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
AGEING AND PRODUCTIVITY HCM 
 
64-2013 Martyna Marczak, 
Víctor Gómez 
MONTHLY US BUSINESS CYCLE INDICATORS: 





65-2013 Dominik Hartmann, 
Andreas Pyka 




66-2013 Christof Ernst, 
Katharina Richter and 
Nadine Riedel 





67-2013 Michael Ahlheim, 
Oliver Frör, Jiang 
Tong, Luo Jing and 
Sonna Pelz 
 
NONUSE VALUES OF CLIMATE POLICY - AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
IN XINJIANG AND BEIJING 
ECO 
 
68-2013 Michael Ahlheim, 
Friedrich Schneider 




69-2013 Fabio Bertoni,  
Tereza Tykvová 
WHICH FORM OF VENTURE CAPITAL IS MOST SUPPORTIVE 
OF INNOVATION? 




70-2013 Tobias Buchmann, 
Andreas Pyka  
THE EVOLUTION OF INNOVATION NETWORKS: 
THE CASE OF A GERMAN AUTOMOTIVE NETWORK 
IK 
 
71-2013 B. Vermeulen, A. 
Pyka, J. A. La Poutré 
and A. G. de Kok  







Beatriz Fabiola López 
Ulloa, Valerie Møller 
and Alfonso Sousa-
Poza   
 
HOW DOES SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING EVOLVE WITH AGE?  









Lucia A. Reisch, 
Wolfgang Ahrens, 
Stefaan De Henauw, 









MATERNAL EMPLOYMENT AND CHILDHOOD OBESITY – 













Annette Hofmann  
 
 
RISIKEN AUS CLOUD-COMPUTING-SERVICES: 









Nadine Riedel and 
Ulrich Schwalbe  
 
 
INTER-FIRM R&D NETWORKS IN PHARMACEUTICAL 
BIOTECHNOLOGY: WHAT DETERMINES FIRM’S 









MACROECONOMIC STABILISATION AND BANK LENDING: 




















THE SUCCESS FACTORS OF TECHNOLOGY-SOURCING 









Andreas Pyka and 
Barbara Heller-Schuh 
 
TURKISH-GERMAN INNOVATION NETWORKS IN THE 








Kai D. Schmid 
 
CAPITAL INCOME SHARES AND INCOME 
INEQUALITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
       ECO 
 
81-2013 Michael Ahlheim, 
Tobias Börger and 
Oliver Frör 
THE INFLUENCE OF ETHNICITY AND CULTURE ON THE 
VALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENTS 
– RESULTS FROM A CVM STUDY IN SOUTHWEST CHINA – 




Fabian Wahl DOES MEDIEVAL TRADE STILL MATTER? HISTORICAL TRADE 
CENTERS, AGGLOMERATION AND CONTEMPORARY 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
       ECO 
 
83-2013 Peter Spahn SUBPRIME AND EURO CRISIS: SHOULD WE BLAME THE 
ECONOMISTS? 
       ECO 
 
84-2013 Daniel Guffarth, 
Michael J. Barber 
THE EUROPEAN AEROSPACE R&D COLLABORATION 
NETWORK 
       IK 
 
85-2013 Athanasios Saitis KARTELLBEKÄMPFUNG UND INTERNE KARTELLSTRUKTUREN: 
EIN NETZWERKTHEORETISCHER ANSATZ 
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86-2014 Stefan Kirn, Claus D. 
Müller-Hengstenberg 
INTELLIGENTE (SOFTWARE-)AGENTEN: EINE NEUE 
HERAUSFORDERUNG FÜR DIE GESELLSCHAFT UND UNSER 
RECHTSSYSTEM? 
 
ICT       
 
87-2014 Peng Nie, Alfonso 
Sousa-Poza 
MATERNAL EMPLOYMENT AND CHILDHOOD OBESITY IN 
CHINA: EVIDENCE FROM THE CHINA HEALTH AND NUTRITION 
SURVEY 
 
HCM        
 
88-2014 Steffen Otterbach, 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
JOB INSECURITY, EMPLOYABILITY, AND HEALTH: 
AN ANALYSIS FOR GERMANY ACROSS GENERATIONS 
HCM        
 




THE GEOGRAPHY OF STOCK EXCHANGES IN IMPERIAL 
GERMANY 
ECO        
 
90-2014 Martyna Marczak, 
Tommaso Proietti 
OUTLIER DETECTION IN STRUCTURAL TIME SERIES 
MODELS: THE INDICATOR SATURATION APPROACH 
ECO        
 
91-2014 Sophie Urmetzer, 
Andreas Pyka 
VARIETIES OF KNOWLEDGE-BASED BIOECONOMIES IK        
 
92-2014 Bogang Jun,  
Joongho Lee 
THE TRADEOFF BETWEEN FERTILITY AND EDUCATION:  
EVIDENCE FROM THE KOREAN DEVELOPMENT PATH 
IK        
 
93-2014 Bogang Jun,  
Tai-Yoo Kim 
NON-FINANCIAL HURDLES FOR HUMAN CAPITAL 
ACCUMULATION: LANDOWNERSHIP IN KOREA UNDER 
JAPANESE RULE 
 
IK        
 




Sonna Pelz  
 
CHINESE URBANITES AND THE PRESERVATION OF RARE 
SPECIES IN REMOTE PARTS OF THE COUNTRY – THE 
EXAMPLE OF EAGLEWOOD 





Javier Pereira and 
Luiz Flávio Autran 
Monteiro Gomes 
 
RANKING THE PERFORMANCE OF NATIONAL INNOVATION 
SYSTEMS IN THE IBERIAN PENINSULA AND LATIN AMERICA 
FROM A NEO-SCHUMPETERIAN ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE 
IK        
 
96-2014 Daniel Guffarth, 
Michael J. Barber 
 
NETWORK EVOLUTION, SUCCESS, AND REGIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE EUROPEAN AEROSPACE INDUSTRY 





Dean’s Office of the Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences
Speisemeistereiflügel – 120
70593 Stuttgart | Germany
Fon  +49 (0)711 459 22488
Fax +49 (0)711 459 22785
E-mail wiso@uni-hohenheim.de 
Web  www.wiso.uni-hohenheim.de
